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A PREMIUM ON GOOD JUDGMENT
Richard N. Haass
This is an institution with a great tradition, and I am honored to have beenasked to address you on this day—an honor made all the greater given the
distinguished individuals who preceded me in years past.
I will be characteristically blunt: you are departing the War College at a time
of considerable international turmoil. Ours is a time of war, or to be more pre-
cise, wars—a global war on terrorism, a war in Afghanistan, and a war in Iraq,
not to mention a conflict in Colombia and conflicts in several countries in Af-
rica. Those who predicted that the world after the end of the Cold War would be
tranquil were wrong, or at least premature. One result is that military force, par-
ticularly American military force, remains relevant, and then some.
But the role of military force is hardly obvious. As we have seen, advantage on
traditional battlefields does not equate to victory. To the contrary, one lesson
many individuals seem to have learned of late is that the one place not to chal-
lenge the United States is on traditional battlefields, where modern conventional
forces easily prevail. Instead, what we are seeing, what we can expect to see, is a
resort to nontraditional battlefields ranging from train stations to shopping
malls, and the use of nontraditional tactics and weapons—above all, terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction.
Coping with such nontraditional challenges will be difficult. I refer here not
simply to technical challenges but also to the intellectual. Take the U.S. decision
to go to war against Iraq. The traditional phase of battle proved relatively
one-sided, the subsequent phase anything but. Clearly, preemptive—or more
accurately, preventive—strikes are one thing, preemptive or preventive wars
quite another.
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Several months ago I first noted publicly that Iraq was a war of choice, not a
war of necessity. My purpose today is not to debate this assertion; much less is it
to take sides as to the correctness of the choice. I also do not intend to debate
whether the previous President Bush was right to go to war to liberate Kuwait—
or whether he was right to stop the war when he did and not to march on to
Baghdad.
Or consider for a moment some of the decisions confronting other govern-
ments. There is a heated debate in Israel over whether it should disengage unilat-
erally from Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Afghanistan’s leaders have to
decide whether, and if so, how, to challenge warlords; Colombia’s government
must tackle the difficult issue of what strategy to employ vis-à-vis the several in-
surgencies active in that country.
Again, my intention here is not to attempt to answer these or similarly com-
plex questions, any one of which could provide the basis for a commencement
address on its own. Rather, I want to raise the issue that is implicit in the debates
that surround all these questions—an issue that is explicit, I would think, in the
course of study you have just completed. How do you discover the wisdom when
confronted with a range of difficult alternatives? How do you exercise good
judgment?
This is important, for the decision to go to war against Iraq will surely not be
the only such decision in the course of your lives and careers. I would predict
that each and every person leaving the Naval War College today will be asked on
several occasions to make difficult choices, to offer analysis and advice, to make
decisions, on matters of war and peace. Some of the situations may resemble
Iraq, in the sense that the question at hand will be whether to attack a country
believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction. Other situations may
more closely resemble Bosnia or Kosovo, in which case the question will be what
to do in the face of ethnic cleansing or genocide. Still others of you will face
questions more pertinent to the particular circumstances of your assignment or
country, or both.
What is certain, though, is that each and every one of you will be confronted
repeatedly by complex choices for which there is no obvious right decision.
What this means is that there is a premium on demonstrating good judgment.
I know that many of you after graduating here will be returning to your own
countries. Let me thus hasten to add that there is nothing uniquely American
about what I am saying here today. It is not simply the obvious point, that Amer-
icans have no monopoly on good judgment, but also that Americans have no
monopoly on the need for it.
First things first. What constitutes good judgment? I would define it as the
ability to assess a situation as accurately and as objectively as possible, and to
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prescribe a response that is feasible and advances one’s interests at the lowest
possible level of costs, be they human, financial, or political.
Sometimes you will be asked to provide good judgment; on other occasions,
you will be on the receiving end of someone else’s judgment, and your challenge
will be to determine whether it is in fact good. Let me suggest that this may be
more difficult than it sounds; unlike pornography, you do not always recognize
good judgment—or bad judgment, for that matter—when you see it. Exercising
good judgment is never easy, but it can be particularly difficult when the issue is
foreign policy and national security. Invariably there is a matter of secrecy; you
rarely know everything, and even knowing what it is that you don’t know can
prove elusive. Language, physical distance, culture—all contribute to the
difficulties.
There is an additional factor that contributes to the challenge of exercising
good judgment. Systems analysis may tell you how many submarines or battle-
ships or aircraft carriers to buy, but it will not tell you whether and how to use
them. Equations do not exist for such inherently subjective assessments, which
are at the core of foreign policy and national security.
So, how does one exercise good judgment? Nothing is more fundamental
than good, old-fashioned assessment of likely costs and benefits inherent in a
possible course of action. One somehow doubts that those who predicted the
benefits of interrogation at the Abu Ghraib prison did a careful evaluation of the
likely costs. Any calculation of costs must also embrace opportunity costs, what
you must give up doing because of what you are doing. Resources dedicated to
one purpose can rarely be made immediately available to another.
But an absolute assessment of the costs and benefits of a proposed course of
action is not enough. You must be equally rigorous about the likely conse-
quences of alternatives. It is fairly easy to find fault with just about any option; it
is not so easy to weigh the relative strengths and weaknesses of multiple options.
It is essential that one option always be inaction. “Don’t just do something,
stand there” can, on occasion, be sage advice. On other occasions, such as when
the world sat on its collective hands as genocide overwhelmed Rwanda in 1994,
doing nothing can be the worst advice. The problem is figuring out what sort of
occasion you are presented with.
In considering costs and benefits, it is important to discriminate carefully be-
tween what is known and what is believed. We have had a powerful example of
just this recently, when many people, including your commencement speaker
today, concluded that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq possessed chemical and biological
weapons when, it appears, it did not.
Groupthink is a real risk in this regard. There is an inevitable tendency for
people who work together and who must continue to work together to begin to
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think alike. Assumptions have a way of sneaking into analysis. That is not neces-
sarily bad, but it can be, if the assumptions go unchallenged or are confused with
facts. The fact that there was not more response to indications prior to 9/11 of
possible terrorist attacks against the United States in part reflects a widely held
view at the time about the nature of the terrorist threat.
I also find it useful to ask what it would take to change your conclusion. Look
at the building blocks of the argument and identify what is the most critical
stone in the foundation. If something should happen to that item, it is a signal to
make sure that your original determination is still valid.
It is always a good idea to consider lessons from history that could prove rele-
vant. I expect that you are all familiar with George Santayana’s dictum that those
who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. But I recommend that you do not ig-
nore my corollary: Make sure the history is relevant. Not every diplomatic com-
promise constitutes another Munich; not every military undertaking that
encounters difficulty is another Vietnam.
Be careful about changing course. This is not an argument against changing
your mind sometime after you first decide. Rather, I am only suggesting that you
do so carefully. Midcourse corrections should be subject to scrutiny no less rig-
orous than that applied to original choices.
The importance of judging correctly goes up with the stakes. One problem is
that stakes tend to be at their highest amidst crises, and crises tend to be precisely
those times when you are most pressed by events and have less ability to think—
not to mention sleep—than is normally the case. Here, as elsewhere in life, you
need to struggle to make sure the urgent does not crowd out the important. You
can guard against some of these risks by turning to other people. If you have the
chance, work hard to create an environment in which those who challenge or-
thodoxy are rewarded, not penalized. Establish competing centers of thought;
the more important it is that you get something right, the more you can afford to
spend on making sure that you do.
One last point. On occasion, your judgment will clash with that of others. The
“other” can be a superior, a subordinate, or a colleague, a civilian, or someone
else in uniform. If experience is any guide, this can be difficult or worse when the
disagreement is with someone who happens to be your superior. As military
professionals, you are well versed in the most familiar dimension of loyalty, that
of accepting civilian authority, of recognizing rank and saluting once a decision
is made and an order given. But it is no less important to fulfill the second di-
mension of loyalty, speaking truth to power.
You may be thinking that all this is obvious, but as one who has spent the bulk
of his career in Washington, I would suggest otherwise. Indeed, Washington is a
town where too often people shy away from telling people what they need to
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hear, falling back on what they want to hear. Or they just refuse to speak up. Acts
of omission can be no less significant than acts of commission.
Letme just say that I have few regrets inmy professional life, but what few I do
possess stem mostly from the things I did not say—or didn’t say loud enough
and often enough—and from the things I did not do. Once you are confident of
your judgment, share it. If you question an assumption, challenge it. If you are
uncomfortable with a decision, voice it. I can think of no better ways for you to
serve your conscience and your country.
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